Momak tek si dosao na forum a vec poceo da serkis de malo bolje procitaj sve pa daji sudove

3.5 On 21 March 2007 at 09.57 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Coughlan in the following terms:

“Hi Mike, do you know the Red Car’s Weight Distribution? It would be important for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator. Thanks in advance, Pedro.
p.s. I will be in the simulator tomorrow.”

3.6 In his evidence given to the WMSC, Mr. de la Rosa confirmed that Coughlan replied by text message with precise details of Ferrari’s weight distribution.

3.7 On 25 March 2007 at 01.43 Mr. de la Rosa sent an e-mail to Fernando Alonso which sets out Ferrari’s weight distribution to two decimal places on each of Ferrari’s two cars as set up for the Australian Grand Prix.

3.8 Mr. Alonso replied to this e-mail on 25 March 2007 at 12.31 (they were in different time zones). His e-mail includes a section headed “Ferrari” in which he says “its weight distribution surprises me; I don’t know either if it’s 100% reliable, but at least it draws attention”. The e-mail continues with a discussion of how McLaren’s weight distribution compares with Ferrari’s.

3.9 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following:

“All the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney, their former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the same person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.”

Ako jos uvijek navijas za Renault. I vi biste mogli zaglaviti na sudu, McLaren isto tako optuzuje Renault za spijunazu i posjedovanje tri diskete za povjerljivim materijalom.

2. da nemaju dokaza i da je sve jedna velika zavjera

Upravo zato ja mislim da u ovoj celoj zajebanciji ima mnogo vise muvanja kojeg mi nismo ni sami svesni i mozemo samo da pretpostavljamo.

Da se ja pitam, ja bih kaznio i McLaren i Ferrari:
McLaren samo zbog posedovanja tih papira - Coughlan ih je mogao koristiti i modifikovane i prilagodjene McL bolidu, tako da na kraju krajeva se isti detalji i ne moraju videti. Da li su delovi i modifikacije slicne ili iste je drugo pitanje po redu.
Ferrari bi kaznio radi izazivanja incidenta i direktno provociranje konkurencije. Nisu ni oni bas cvecke... Njihov covek se sastajao sa McLarenovim, njihov covek je predao CD-e i kako izgleda insistirao na prelazku obojice u treci tim. Da, Ferrari je tu "manje kriv", ali i te kako ima svoje prste umesane.

U jedinom slucaju upste ne bi bili krivi, a to je kada bi neko ukrao te dokumente iz Ferrarija. Sto je, priznacete, ne bas moguce.

I na kraju krajeva... da pretpostavimo onaj najbizarniji nacin... mozda su celnici Ferrarija namerno sve ovo uradili jer su bili skoro sigurni da ce Coulghan pokusati da koristi ili iskoristiti neke od dokumenata. Onda "neko tamo" oda informaciju i to je to. Oni kao "zrtve", a ostali kao "nacisti".

Pratili su oni Stepney-a i Coughlana i pre nego sto je glupa zena ovog Engleza otisla do stamparije. Ali sad, kad se vec i javnost tu umesala, onda daj da otkrijemo slucaj i pokrenemo proces...

Siguran sam da ce se McLaren finansijski izvuci mozda vec sledece sezone, ali je ceo sport stradao radi ovoga na mnogo duze vreme.

weight distribution
3.5 On 21 March 2007 at 09.57 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Coughlan in the following
terms:
“Hi Mike, do you know the Red Car’s Weight Distribution? It would be
important for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator. Thanks in
advance, Pedro.
p.s. I will be in the simulator tomorrow.”
3.6 In his evidence given to the WMSC, Mr. de la Rosa confirmed that Coughlan
replied by text message with precise details of Ferrari’s weight distribution.

3.7 On 25 March 2007 at 01.43 Mr. de la Rosa sent an e-mail to Fernando Alonso
which sets out Ferrari’s weight distribution to two decimal places on each of
Ferrari’s two cars as set up for the Australian Grand Prix.
3.8 Mr. Alonso replied to this e-mail on 25 March 2007 at 12.31 (they were in
different time zones). His e-mail includes a section headed “Ferrari” in which he
says “its weight distribution surprises me; I don’t know either if it’s 100%
reliable, but at least it draws attention”. The e-mail continues with a discussion
of how McLaren’s weight distribution compares with Ferrari’s.
3.9 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following:
“All the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney,
their former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the
same person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very
friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.”
3.10 Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail to Coughlan specifically stated that he wished to receive
Ferrari’s weight distribution for the purposes of testing it in the simulator the
following day (“It would be important for us to know so that we could try it in the
simulator”). Mr. de la Rosa explained to the WMSC at the meeting of 13
September 2007 that when Coughlan responded with the precise details in
question, he (de la Rosa) decided that the weight distribution was so different to
the McLaren car set up that it would not, in fact, be tested in the simulator. Mr de
la Rosa says that thereafter he regarded the information as unimportant. It seems
highly unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would take a decision of this sort
on his own. It also is not clear why, if Mr. de la Rosa regarded this information as
unimportant, he would still convey and discuss it with Mr. Alonso some days later
in his e-mail exchange of 25th March. Mr. de la Rosa’s evidence also makes clear
that there was no reluctance or hesitation about testing the Ferrari information for
potential benefit, but only that on this occasion he says that there was a technical
reason not to do so.
3.11 McLaren's Chief Engineer Mr. Lowe gave clear evidence that decisions relating
to simulator testing would normally involve a number of engineering and other
staff (as would running the tests themselves). It seems highly unlikely that
decisions about what would be run in the simulator would by taken by a test
driver on his own.

flexible wing and aero balance
3.12 In the same e-mail exchange of 25 March 2007, Mr. de la Rosa states that tests
had been carried out on a flexible rear wing which Mr. de la Rosa says is “a copy
of the system we think Ferrari uses”. The Ferrari car’s precise aero balance at 250
kph is also identified. While it is conceivable that the former item could have
been copied from observation of the Ferrari car, it is clear from the context of the
exchange (it being part of the information that Mr. de la Rosa describes as being
“very reliable” because it comes from Stepney) that the latter item is confidential
to Ferrari and that it was passed to Mr. de la Rosa by Coughlan, who got it from
Stepney.
tyre gas
3.13 Mr de la Rosa’s e-mail to Mr. Alonso on 25 March 2007 at 01.43 identified a gas
that Ferrari uses to inflate its tyres to reduce the internal temperature and
blistering. The e-mail concludes with a statement (in relation to the gas) that
“we’ll have to try it, it’s easy!”.
3.14 Mr Alonso replied at 12.31 that it is “very important” that McLaren test the gas
that Ferrari uses in its tyres as “they have something different from the rest”, and
“not only this year. there is something else and this may be the key; let’s hope
we can test it during this test, and that we can make it a priority!”.
3.15 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following: I agree
100% that we must test the [tyre gas] thing very soon.
3.16 Although the e-mail exchange between Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa makes
clear that they both were enthusiastic about trying the gas apparently used by
Ferrari in its tyres, Mr de la Rosa's evidence to the WMSC was that he, on his
own, decided to explore with a Bridgestone engineer whether the McLaren team
should try this gas. He states that he had no other conversations with any other
specialist staff within McLaren. His evidence is that the Bridgestone engineer in
question doubted whether the gas would confer an advantage upon McLaren.
According to Mr de la Rosa, without further consultation with anyone else at
McLaren, and despite the fact that this had apparently been successfully used at
Ferrari, the idea was dropped and no actual attempt was made to test the gas in the
tyres used by McLaren.
3.17 It seems unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would engage in such
consultations on his own without discussing it any further with anyone else at the
team. It also seems unlikely that a decision on whether to pursue the matter
further would be taken by a test driver on his own. Finally, Mr de la Rosa’s
evidence makes clear that there was no reluctance or hesitation about using the
Ferrari information, but only that on this occasion it was concluded that there
would be no advantage in doing so.
braking system
3.18 On 12 April 2007 at 12.25 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Mr. Coughlan and asked “ can
you explain me as much as you can, Ferrari’s braking system with the [reference
to detailed technical information]? Are they adjusting from inside the cockpit…?”
3.19 After a number of exchanges about whether a description would be too
complicated to articulate by e-mail, Mr. Coughlan replies on 14 April 2007 at
14.40 with a technical description which purports to be a description of the
principles underpinning the Ferrari braking system. Ferrari have confirmed that
the description given is an accurate (though incomplete) description of the
principles of its braking system. Coughlan concludes with a statement that “we
are looking at something similar”. This latter statement strongly suggests that the
McLaren system was being worked on from a position of knowledge of the details
of the Ferrari system, which, even if the Ferrari system not being directly copied,
must be more advantageous to McLaren than designing a system without such
knowledge.
3.20 The e-mail exchange between Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso dated 25 March
2007 at 01.43 also describes some aspects of the McLaren braking system and
states that “with the information that we have, we believe Ferrari has a similar
system” and goes on to describe highly specific elements of the Ferrari system
(which cannot be set out here for confidentiality reasons but which clearly
demonstrate knowledge of Ferrari’s confidential information).
stopping strategy
3.21 As mentioned above, Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail on 25 March 2007 13.02 stated “all
the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney, their
former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the same
person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very
friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.
3.22 The evidence before the WMSC is that Mr. Räikkönen (Kimi) actually stopped at
lap 19 at the Australian GP. However, the fact remains that Mr de la Rosa cited
this information as a reason to believe that Stepney was a reliable source of
information. This strongly suggests that McLaren had at least taken account of
this information in determining its own strategy.
3.23 The evidence before the WMSC also demonstrates that Stepney had fed
information through Coughlan regarding which lap one or more of the Ferrari
drivers would stop at during the Bahrain Grand Prix. McLaren has sought to
discredit the significance of this information as it proved in the end to be
inaccurate. However, the evidence before the WMSC was that the safety car had
been deployed early in the race making it likely that stopping strategies would be
adjusted. This deployment of the safety car could not have been known in
advance of the race and the fact that the stoppage predictions proved inaccurate
does not mean that McLaren had not considered and taken account of the
information that had been received in determining its own strategy before the
race.
3.24 In any case, as there is no legitimate context in which another teams’ stopping
strategy would be revealed to McLaren in advance, there is very clear evidence
that both drivers knew that they were receiving unauthorised and confidential
Ferrari information. To the WMSC’s knowledge, no effort was taken to report or
stem this flow.
4 New Evidence – Communications between Coughlan and Stepney
4.1 The evidence put before the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that a limited
number of contacts had occurred between Coughlan and Stepney. Coughlan’s
affidavit (submitted in the context of the High Court Proceedings) identified a
number of such contacts and described incidents where specific Ferrari
confidential information was transferred to him. The WMSC considered these
contacts but had no specific evidence of further or other contacts. The focus at
the 26 July WMSC meeting was on the circumstances surrounding the
transmission of the 780 page Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home.
4.2 New evidence has come to light which strongly indicates that the transmission of
confidential Ferrari information from Stepney to Coughlan was not limited to the
780 page dossier. This evidence demonstrates that a far greater level of
communication existed between Coughlan and Stepney than was appreciated at
the 26 July WMSC meeting. This evidence was submitted by Ferrari and is
deemed credible as it originates from the Italian police and is the result of an
official analysis of records of telephone, SMS and e-mail contacts between
Coughlan and Stepney. The evidence included the following.
4.3 In its report “Allegato 18”, the Italian Police demonstrated that in the period 21
March to 3 July 2007, Coughlan received 23 calls from Stepney’s personal mobile
phone and made four calls to that phone. In the same period, Coughlan received
124 SMS messages from Stepney and sent 66 SMS messages to Stepney.
4.4 In its report “Allegato 9” the Italian Police have identified logs which show 23 emails
passed between Coughlan and Stepney between 1 March and 14 April
2007.
4.5 In its report “Allegato 10” the Italian police have identified a further 98 SMS
messages and a further eight telephone calls (on different phones) between
Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March and 14 April 2007.
4.6 In total, at least 288 SMS messages and 35 telephone calls appear to have passed
between Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March 2007 and 3 July 2007.
4.7 The number of contacts increased considerably during private tests carried out by
Ferrari in Malaysia at the end of March 2007 and in the run up to and during the
days of the Grands Prix in Australia on 18 March 2007, Malaysia on 8 April
2007, Bahrain on 15 April 2007 and Spain on 13 May 2007.
4.8 The evidence of the Italian police that has been produced also states that Stepney
sought technical details from Ferrari’s chief mechanic, Mr Uguzzoni, about tests
carried out by Ferrari in Malaysia in a way that drew attention within Ferrari at
the time.
4.9 In addition, e-mails between McLaren drivers were produced to the 13 September
WMSC meeting (see above) stating clearly that Coughlan had received
information from Stepney regarding the Ferrari car and had passed this
information to others within the McLaren team.
4.10 Neither Ferrari nor McLaren have ever disputed (whether at the 26 July WMSC
meeting or since) that confidential Ferrari information was passed from Stepney
to Coughlan during the period in question. However, the new evidence regarding
the number and timing of the contacts makes it far more likely that there was a
systematic flow of Ferrari confidential information to Coughlan leading to the
conclusion that the illicit communication of information was very likely not
limited to the transmission of the Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home
on 3 July 2007. This conclusion is corroborated in the e-mails exchanged
between McLaren’s drivers (see above).
4.11 McLaren stated in its submissions for the 13 September WMSC meeting that this
new evidence on the number and timing of the communications merely confirmed
what was already known: that Coughlan and Stepney were illicitly sharing Ferrari
confidential information. It has also been suggested by McLaren that Coughlan
and Stepney were acting on their own account and that possibly they were
planning to seek new employment together elsewhere.
4.12 Without drawing a definitive conclusion on this point, the WMSC considered that
it was difficult to reconcile this version of events with the number and timing of
the contacts described above as if Coughlan and Stepney had simply been sharing
information to facilitate a plan to search for new employment there would appear
to be no particular reason for the contacts to have intensified around the tests and
the Grands Prix and no reason for Coughlan to share information with McLaren’s
drivers. Rather, it appeared more likely that the information being exchanged
related to those tests and the Grands Prix.
4.13 Further, in light of Coughlan’s role within the McLaren team, it had seemed
unlikely to the WMSC at the meeting on 26 July 2007 that Coughlan himself
would have been able to make any direct or immediate use (whether personal or
within his role at McLaren) of up to date information relating to the Ferrari car at
the site of different Grands Prix. However, as detailed above, at the 13 September
WMSC meeting, the WMSC heard new evidence to suggest that this was not the
case and that Coughlan had, in fact, communicated to at least one McLaren driver
statements from Stepney of which lap the Ferrari drivers would stop at during
both the Australian Grand Prix and the Bahrain Grand Prix. These
communications between Coughlan and at least one of the McLaren drivers
coincided exactly in time with some of the most intense period of contact between
Coughlan and Stepney described above.
4.14 In the absence of another explanation, in light of the number and timing of the
communications between Coughlan and Stepney and the e-mail exchanges
between the McLaren drivers (see above), the WMSC regards it as reasonable to
infer that Coughlan was in receipt of a flow of confidential Ferrari information
from Stepney and that at least some of that information was communicated to
others within McLaren (e.g. Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso).
4.15 In sum, the new information on the number and timing of the contacts between
Coughlan and Stepney inevitably had an impact on the WMSC’s appreciation of
the nature of the contacts between Coughlan and Stepney, on its appreciation of
the emails between the drivers and on the likelihood of Ferrari confidential
information received by Coughlan having an influence on his work with
McLaren.
5 Coughlan’s Role at McLaren
5.1 McLaren’s submission made for and at the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that
Coughlan had a relatively limited managerial role and that it would not be
possible for him to propose ideas without having to explain their provenance. In
McLaren’s submission, this demonstrated that, despite having detailed Ferrari
technical information, Coughlan could not have used any of this information to
benefit McLaren without a significant number of people at McLaren knowing.
McLaren submitted statements from a number of its engineers that those
engineers were not aware of changes made to the McLaren car using confidential
Ferrari information.
5.2 The submissions made for the 13 September WMSC meeting show that that
Coughlan may have had a more active role in the design of the McLaren car than
previously appreciated by the WMSC.
5.3 The WMSC does not have evidence that any complete Ferrari design was copied
and subsequently wholly incorporated into the McLaren car as a result of
Coughlan passing confidential from Stepney to McLaren. However, it is difficult
to accept that the secret Ferrari information that was within Coughlan’s
knowledge never influenced his judgement in the performance of his duties. It is
not necessary for McLaren to have copied a complete Ferrari design for it to have
benefited from Coughlan’s knowledge. For example, the secret Ferrari
information cannot but have informed the views Coughlan expressed to others in
the McLaren design department, for example regarding which design projects to
prioritise or which research to pursue. The advantage gained may have been as
subtle as Coughlan being in a position to suggest alternative ways of approaching
different design challenges.
6 Evidence of Mr. Neale
6.1 At the 26 July WMSC meeting (and the evidence was repeated at the hearing of
13 September) it was noted that Coughlan had revealed to his superior at
McLaren, Mr. Neale, that Stepney had attempted to pass secret Ferrari
information to Coughlan. A firewall was set up at the instigation of Mr. Neale to
prevent further contacts from Stepney and Coughlan was directed to cease contact
with Stepney. Within a matter of weeks thereafter, Coughlan attempted to show
some photographs to Mr. Neale which, according to Mr. Neale himself, because
of the manner in which they were produced, suggested to Mr. Neale that they
should not have been in Coughlan’s possession. Rather than establish the facts
and take appropriate action as his superior at McLaren, Mr. Neale advised
Coughlan to destroy the photographs. Coming as soon as it did after McLaren
had been required to install a firewall and had directed this same employee to
cease contact with a known source of Ferrari confidential information, the WMSC
notes that it is very unsatisfactory that no further action was taken to investigate
this matter further and make appropriate disclosures to the FIA as regulator.